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Abstract
This paper provides an extension of Morris and Shin’s (2002) model (Morris, S., Shin, H. S.
(2002). Social value of public information. The American Economic Review, 92(5), 1521-1534.). It
considers an “interpretation bias” of the public signal sent by central banks such as the ECB or
the FED. It is shown that such a bias is detrimental and should be considered when central banks
implement their communication policy.
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1 Introduction
Through their words, central bankers try to influence expectations of financial markets, hence, central
bank watchers, financial media and market participants pay considerable attention to central bankers’
statements. Communication has thus become an important tool for central banks, more and more de-
scribed as the art of managing expectations (Woodford, 2001), since it can enhance the predictability
of monetary policy decisions and helps achieve central bank’s macroeconomic objectives. According to
Blinder et al. (2008), central bank communication is used nowadays to manage expectations by “creat-
ing news” (i.e., the central bank’s announcements that influence expectations and move asset prices in
the desired way) and “reducing noise” (i.e., how a central bank talks increases the predictability of its
actions).
Most of the empirical studies that focus on the predictability of central banks statements refer to central
banks such as the ECB and the FED. There is a broad consensus that ECB and FED communication
contains forward guidance and moves financial markets in the intended direction (Musard-Gies, 2006;
Willhemsen and Zaghini, 2011; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009). Carlson et al. (2006) find that the
communication framework built by the FOMC improved the public’s ability to predict interest rate deci-
sions. Ullrich (2008) investigates the influence of the ECB communication on the inflation expectations
of experts. She finds that the ECB statements given at the press conferences following the interest rate
decisions influence inflation expectations of experts. Rosa (2009) finds that the tone of central bank
statements is an important explanatory variable of future changes in the ECB main refinancing rate.
However, in these currency areas, monetary policy is particular in the sense that it is conducted within
a multi-cultural and multi-lingual context. As an illustration, half of the US dollar circulates abroad
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(Judson, 2012), this currency is then also used by agents with different cultural backgrounds and be-
longings. Therefore, are agents from different (member1) countries able to understand in the same way
the communication of these central banks, i.e., have similar expectations about the future path of the
policy rate? Or, are expectations about monetary policy influenced by different national backgrounds?
Berger et al. (2009, 2011), using a database of surveys of professional ECB and FED policy forecasters,
find persistent differences in forecast accuracy. According to the authors, these differences are related
not only to the skills of analysts, but also to geography and to national macroeconomic conditions (i.e.,
deviations of national inflation from the euro/US area average). For instance, they find that financial
institutions that are based in Frankfurt perform better in predicting ECB policy decisions.
Given that forecasters rely heavily on central bank’s communication, these results might unveil the pres-
ence of an asymmetry in the transmission mechanism of ECB’s and FED’s communication policy, which
takes the form of a different interpretation of these central banks’ public signals. Indeed, the assump-
tion of common interpretation of public information has been put in question by the literature in many
fields. Lahiri and Sheng (2008) argue that professional forecasters, while observing the same statistical
data, persistently disagree on the future rates of inflation, unemployment and GDP growth. Psycholog-
ical studies find that one reason of these persistent differences may be overconfidence2. Finally, Odean
(1998) find empirical evidences that agents keep on following their convictions, even after learning that
they disagree and that they may be wrong.
To the best of our knowledge, no study has yet assessed the consequences of the presence of an asymme-
try in the transmission mechanism of the communication policy of central banks such as the ECB or the
FED. Hence, in this paper, we extend the theoretical framework of Morris and Shin (2002) (henceforth
MS, 2002) to include the “interpretation bias” that may emerge among agents located in different coun-
tries when considering ECB’s and FED’s public announcements. We show how their individual welfare
is affected by this misinterpretation. Our results highlight the negative effects induced by the presence
of an “interpretation bias” of the public signal.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 presents the
results, while the last section concludes.
2 The model
We consider a central bank that has an inflation objective pio, as the ECB or the FED:
LNTt =
1
2
E[(1 + θ)y2t + (β − θ)(pit − pio)2] (1)
where pit denotes the inflation rate at time t, pi
o the inflation objective, Et the expectations operator,
yt the output gap, and where uncertainty about the central bank’s preferences is represented by the
random variable θ. It is assumed that θ ∈ [-1, β] and that E(θ) = 0, E(θ2) = σ2θ . In other words, there
is an informational asymmetry between the central bank and the general public about the weight of the
arguments in the monetary authority’s objective function, as in, e.g., Chortareas and Miller (2003) or
Ciccarone and Marchetti (2012).
The central bank acts under the constraint of a standard Lucas-supply function3:
yt = pit − piet + ξt (2)
1Such as in the Euro area
2Ben David et al. (2010) show that top financial executives are too confident with respect to their own knowledge and
own understanding of the model of the world. They are persistently failing in learning how to make correct inferences from
the data.
3Fendel and Ru¨lke (2012) and Abott and Mart´ınez (2008) provide empirical evidence on the Lucas Supply function for
developed economies, they find that the inflation surprise positively correlates with the output gap.
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where piet denotes private sector expectations about the relevant state of inflation, and ξt is the supply
shock with zero mean and constant variance, σ2ξ . We assume that the central bank’s instrument is pit.
Standard resolution by minimizing the loss function with regard to inflation delivers the inflation rate
under the non inflation targeting framework:
pit =
(β − θ)2pio + α2(1 + θ)2(piet − ξt)
α2(1 + θ)2 + (β − θ)2 (3)
For simplification purposes, we drop ξt as it does not change the qualitative nature of our results:
pit =
(β − θ)2
α2(1 + θ)2 + (β − θ)2pi
o +
α2(1 + θ)2
α2(1 + θ)2 + (β − θ)2pi
e
t (4)
This specification suggests that the inflation outcome is a function of both the inflation objective the
central bank pursues pio, and the expectations of the private sector piet .
2.1 The formation of expectations
We assume that private agents form expectations and aim at minimizing the expected error with regard
to the actual inflation rate. Therefore, the loss function of agent i takes the following form:
Li(pi
e
t , pi
o) =
1
2
Ei(pi
e
i,t − pit)2 (5)
where piei,t is agent i
′s expectation of inflation at time t, and pit is the ex-post inflation outcome. Agent
i seeks to minimize her loss function, given her own information (see Appendix A).
Agent i decides her inflation expectation piei,t, based on the first-order condition of (5).
arg min Li(pi
e
t , pi
o) = Ei(pit) (6)
and from (3),
piei,t = Ei(pit)
piei,t =
(β − θ)2
α2(1 + θ)2 + (β − θ)2Ei(pi
o) +
α2(1 + θ)2
α2(1 + θ)2 + (β − θ)2Ei(pi
e
t ) (7)
where Ei(pi
o) is agent’s i expectation of the inflation objective of the central bank, and Ei(pi
e
t ) is the
expectation of agent i of private sector expectations.
We can rewrite (7) as follows:
piei,t = (1− r)Ei(pio) + rEi(piet ) (8)
This form is of the same type as in MS (2002), with the parameter r representing the importance the
agent attaches to the “beauty contest”, i.e., the strength with which the agent tries to second-guess the
others’ expectations.
Therefore, the inflation expectation of agent i is a function of two things: its expectation of the objective
policy of the central bank, and the average expectation formed by all the agents.
Following the model of MS (2002), we suppose that information used by the agents is available in the
form of a public signal. We add that this signal is common knowledge to all agents but can interpreted
differently according to their respective cultural backgrounds, given that they are located in different
countries (Berger et al., 2009, 2011). Agents’ information is also composed of a private signal that is
3
specific to each agent. Agent i observes p and s:
Public signal : pi = pi
o + η + λi (9)
Private signal : si = pi
o + εi (10)
where η, λi and εi have a zero mean and constant variance, σ
2
η, σ
2
λ and σ
2
ε , respectively. The three error
terms are independent of pio and of each other, such that E(εi,εj) = 0 and E(λi,λj) = 0 for i 6= j. We
consider that the public signal contains an error term η that is common to all agents and an error term
λi that is idiosyncratic, in the same spirit as Cornand and Baeriswyl (2014).
One might argue that the “interpretation bias” of the public signal could end up in a different private
signal for every agent, and thus, be included in the error term (εi). However, our focus here is on the
subjective interpretation, which leads to a differently interpreted common (public) signal. This can be
grounded, for instance, on results from the behavioral or psychological literatures (Grosjean and Oswald,
2004). It is then important to model the “interpretation bias” as an error term in the public signal (λi)
to disentangle its specific impact on the agent’s loss function, with respect to the impacts of the other
motives4 that have already been raised in the existing literature (Amato and Shin, 2003; Demertzis and
Viegi, 2009; James and Lawler, 2012).
2.2 Equilibrium
Following equation (8), in order to derive the Bayesian equilibrium expectation of agents, we express
the first order expectation of agent i about the inflation objective of the central bank and the average
expectation of the public signal observed by the other agents5.
Ei(pi
o | pi, si) =
σ2η + σ
2
λ
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
λ
si +
σ2ε
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
λ
pi (11)
Ei(p
e | pi, si) = σ
2
λ
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
λ
si +
σ2ε + σ
2
η
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
λ
pi (12)
Supposing that agent j (with i 6= j) is following a linear strategy of the form:
pij = (1− k)sj + kpj (13)
With ∫ 1
0
pijdj = pi
e
t
Ei
∫ 1
0
sjdj = Ei(s
e) = Ei(pi
o | pi, si)
Ei
∫ 1
0
pjdj = Ei(p
e) = Ei(p
e | pi, si) (14)
Then, agent’s i estimate of the average expected inflation across all agents is:
Ei(pi
e
t ) = (1− k)Ei(pio | pi, si) + kEi(pe | pi, si)
Ei(pi
e
t ) = (1− k)
(σ2η + σ
2
λ)si + σ
2
εpi
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
λ
+ k
σ2λsi + (σ
2
ε + σ
2
η)pi
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
λ
(15)
4E.g., different information sets or different models.
5Given the “interpretation bias”, public signal is no longer a fully common knowledge, i.e., agent i has to make an
expectation of the public signal observed by the other agents.
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Inserting these in (8), the optimal inflation expectation of agent i can be expressed as (for details, see
Appendix B):
piei,t = (1− r)Ei(pio) + rEi(piet )
piei,t = (1− r)[
(σ2η + σ
2
λ)si + σ
2
εpi
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
λ
] + r[(1− k) (σ
2
η + σ
2
λ)si + σ
2
εpi
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
λ
+ k
σ2λsi + (σ
2
ε + σ
2
η)pi
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
λ
]
piei,t =
(1− r)σ2η + σ2λ
σ2ε + (1− r)σ2η + σ2λ
si +
σ2ε
σ2ε + (1− r)σ2η + σ2λ
pi (16)
Thus, the inflation expectation made by agent i is an average of both his signals whose weighting depends
upon their relative precision and the value of the “beauty contest” r.
The weight attributed by each agent to the public signal is smaller than in the equilibrium of MS (2002)
and is decreasing with σ2λ. This indicates that a public signal with an “interpretation bias” has a lower
weight than in MS (2002).
We decompose pi and si from (9) and (10) to obtain the following form:
piei,t = pi
o +
εi[(1− r)σ2η + σ2λ] + σ2ε(η + λi)
σ2ε + (1− r)σ2η + σ2λ
(17)
The average inflation expected by all agents yields6:
piet =
∫ 1
0
pijdj
piet =
∫ 1
0
pio +
εj [(1− r)σ2η + σ2λ] + σ2ε(η + λj)
σ2ε + (1− r)σ2η + σ2λ
dj
piet = pi
o +
σ2εη
σ2ε + (1− r)σ2η + σ2λ
(18)
Equation (18) reveals that the average inflation expectation across all agents is distorted by the precision
of the three terms and the preference attached to the “beauty contest” r.
3 Expected welfare
Following (5), we determine agent’s i loss function (see Appendix C):
Li =
σ2ε [x
2 + σ4λ + 2xσ
2
λ] + σ
4
ε(σ
2
η(1− r)2 + σ2λ + 2η(1− r)λi) + q[x+ σ2λ]
2[σ2ε + x+ σ
2
λ]
2
(19)
In the next step, we differentiate the loss function with respect to λi, σ
2
η, and σ
2
ε , to determine how
agent’s i welfare is affected by the existence of an “interpretation bias” of the public signal, and the
degree of precision of the public and private signals.
6Following the set up made by MS (2002), when aggregating private errors (λi and εi) across all agents, these errors
are eliminated, i.e.,
∫ 1
0 λidi = 0 and
∫ 1
0 εidi = 0, while the public information always appears in the final solution with a
non-zero error term. According to Demertzis (2012), this is due to the law of large numbers.
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3.1 The effect of the interpretation bias
We start by estimating the impact of the “interpretation bias” on agent’s i individual welfare:
∂Li
∂λi
=
σ2ε(σ
2
η(1− r) + σ2λ) + η(1− r)σ4ε
(σ2λ(1− r) + σ2ε + σ2λ)2
(20)
The result reveals that the relation between the term refereing to the “interpretation bias” of the public
signal, λi, and the individual welfare loss, Li, is strictly positive. In other words, the more agent’s i
interprets differently the public signal sent by the central bank, the more detrimental is its effect on
his welfare. This result seems intuitive given the recent findings about the negative effects of divergent
expectations on the individual welfare (Richter and Throckmorton, 2013).
PROPOSITION 1: The presence of an “interpretation bias” of the public signal has a detrimen-
tal impact on the individual welfare of the agent.
3.2 Public Information precision
To determine the expected welfare of the agent with a variance of the precision of public information,
we differentiate the expression (19) with respect to σ2η:
∂Li
∂σ2η
= (r-1)
q(x+ σ2λ) + σ
2
ε(x
2 + 2xσ2λ + σ
4
λ) + σ
4
ε(σ
2
η(1− r)2 + 2ηλi(1− r) + σ2λ)
(σ2ε + x+ σ
2
λ)
3︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
(21)
+
q(1− r) + σ4ε(1− r)2 + σ2ε(2σ2λ(1− r)2) + 2x
2(σ2ε + x+ σ
2
λ)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
(22)
Given that 0 < r < 1, a > 0 and b > 0, the impact of more precise public signal (corresponding to a
decrease of σ2η) on individual welfare is ambiguous when public information is interpreted differently.
When the weight attached to the “beauty contest” r converges to 1, i.e., when agent i aims to align
his expectations close to the expectations of the other agents, the negative effect of more precise public
information on individual welfare decreases. This result seems intuitive as an increase of the weight
attached to r (r → 1) means that the effect of the “interpretation bias” on the signal announced by the
ECB or the FED is diminishing. Therefore, given that inflation is also determined by private-sector
expectations (eq.4), the welfare loss of the agent (eq.5) is decreasing when he sets his expectations
close to the ones of the rest of the agents, and gives less weight to his own interpretation. However,
when the value of the “beauty contest” decreases (r → 0), i.e., when the agent is less concerned by the
expectations of the other agents and tends to put more weight on his own interpretation of the public
signal, the effect of more precise public information is more negative on his welfare, as a consequence,
the latter decreases with the precision of public information.
This result confirms the findings of previous empirical studies, for which better public information is
beneficial only in particular economic contexts (Woodford, 2005; Hellwig, 2005; Angeletos and Pavan,
2007; Roca, 2010).
PROPOSITION 2: The precision of public information has an ambiguous impact on the individ-
ual welfare of the agent, its potential negative effect decreases when the agent does not consider his own
interpretation of the public signal and aims to align his expectations to the expectations of the other
agents.
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3.3 Private information precision
The impact of the precision of private information on expected welfare is:
∂Li
∂σ2ε
= −[σ
2
ε(x
2 + σ4λ + 2xσ
2
λ) + σ
2
ε(σ
2
η(1− r)2 + σ2λ + 2η(1− r)λi)2 + q(x+ σ2λ)
(σ2ε + x+ σ
2
λ)
3
] (23)
The sign of ∂Li∂σ2ε
is strictly negative. The welfare of the agent is decreasing in the precision of the private
signal (corresponding to a reduction of σ2ε), i.e., in equilibrium, greater precision of the agent’s private
information is detrimental to individual welfare.
This finding comes in contrast with the results of MS (2002) and previous empirical studies, for which
an increase in the precision of private information is always beneficial. But in the case of multiple
interpretation of the public signal, this result seems rather intuitive. Indeed, given that agents do not
interpret the information given by the central bank in a similar way, some of them are considered as
having better information sets than others (for instance the forecasters located in Frankfurt, see Berger
et al., 2009), thus digging the gap between agents’ inflation expectations. This leads to an increase of the
difference between agent’s i expectation and the private sector expectation, and thus, between agent’s
i inflation expectation and the actual inflation rate (eq.4). Given the specific form of the loss function
(eq.5), the individual welfare declines necessarily. Therefore, the existence of an “interpretation bias”
of the public signal makes the impact of a more precise private signal harmful for the welfare of the agents.
PROPOSITION 3: An Increase in the precision of the private signal has negative effects on in-
dividual welfare in the presence of an “interpretation bias” of the public signal.
Conclusion
Given that some central banks are implementing a monetary policy in a multi-lingual and multi-cultural
context, it is a challenge for these institutions to be understood uniformly when communicating about
their monetary policy. In this paper, we highlight the detrimental effects of the presence of an “in-
terpretation bias” of the public information conveyed by the ECB or the FED among heterogeneous
agents. This raises the question of whether the communication policy of these central banks is consistent
enough to tackle the negative consequences of the “interpretation bias”, and opens further questions for
upcoming researches.
APPENDIX
Appendix A
Li(pi
e, pio) =
1
2
Ei(pi
e
i,t − pit)2
Li(pi
e, pio) =
1
2
Ei((pi
e
i,t)
2 − 2piei,tpit + (pit)2)
∂Li
∂pit
(pie, pio) =
1
2
Ei(2pi
e
i,t − 2pit) = 0
Ei(pi
e
i,t) = Ei(pit)
Appendix B
pii = (1− r)Ei(pio) + rEi(piet )
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With
Ei(pi
o | si, pi) =
σ2η + σ
2
λ
σ2ε+ σ2η + σ
2
λ
si +
σ2ε
σ2ε+ σ2η + σ
2
λ
pi
Ei(pi
e
t ) = (1− k)se + kpe
Ei(s
e) = Ei[pi
o | pi, si]
Ei(p
e) = Ei(p
e | pi, si) = σ
2
λ
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
λ
si +
σ2ε + σ
2
η
σ2ε+ σ2η + σ
2
λ
pi
piei,t = (1− r)[
(σ2η + σ
2
λ)si + σ
2
εpi
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
λ
] + r[(1− k) (σ
2
η + σ
2
λ)si + σ
2
εpi
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
λ
+ k
σ2λsi + (σ
2
ε + σ
2
η)pi
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
λ
]
piei,t =
σ2ε + rkσ
2
η
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
pi +
σ2η + σ
2
λ − rkσ2η
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1−k)
si
With
piei,t = kpi + (1− k)si
Then
k =
σ2ε
σ2ε + σ
2
η(1− r) + σ2λ
1− k = σ
2
η(1− r) + σ2λ
σ2ε + σ
2
η(1− r) + σ2λ
Appendix C
Li(pi
e
t , pi
o) =
1
2
Ei(pi
e
i,t − pit)2
With
piei,t = pi
o +
εi[(1− r)σ2η + σ2λ] + σ2ε(η + λi)
σ2ε + (1− r)σ2η + σ2λ
And
pit =
(β − θ)2
α2(1 + θ)2 + (β − θ)2pi
o +
α2(1 + θ)2
α2(1 + θ)2 + (β − θ)2pi
e
t
piet = pi
o +
σ2εη
σ2ε + (1− r)σ2η + σ2λ
Following (7), we know that:
(β − θ)2
α2(1 + θ)2 + (β − θ)2 = (1− r)
α2(1 + θ)2
α2(1 + θ)2 + (β − θ)2 = r
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Therefore
pit = pi
o +
rσ2εη
[σ2ε + (1− r)σ2η + σ2λ]
Then
Li(pi
e
t , pi
o) =
1
2
Ei[pi
o +
εi[(1− r)σ2η + σ2λ] + σ2ε(η + λi)
σ2ε + (1− r)σ2η + σ2λ
−(pio + r σ
2
εη
[σ2ε + (1− r)σ2η + σ2λ]
)]2
Li =
1
2
Ei[
εi[(1− r)σ2η + σ2λ] + σ2ε(η + λi)
σ2ε + (1− r)σ2η + σ2λ
− rσ
2
εη
[σ2ε + (1− r)σ2η + σ2λ]
]2
Li =
1
2
Ei[
εi[(1− r)σ2η + σ2λ] + σ2ε(η(1− r) + λi)
[σ2ε + (1− r)σ2η + σ2λ]
]2
Li =
1
2
Ei
(εi[(1− r)σ2η + σ2λ])2 + [σ2ε(η(1− r) + λi)]2 + 2εi[(1− r)σ2η + σ2λ]σ2ε(η(1− r) + λi)
[[σ2ε + (1− r)σ2η + σ2λ]]2
With
Ei(ε
2
i ) = σ
2
ε
Ei(η
2) = σ2η
Ei(λ
2
i ) = σ
2
λ
We obtain
Li =
σ2ε [(1− r)2σ4η + σ4λ + 2(1− r)σ2ησ2λ] + σ4ε(σ2η(1− r)2 + σ2λ + 2η(1− r)λi) + 2ε[(1− r)σ2η + σ2λ]σ2ε(η(1− r) + λi)
2[σ2ε + (1− r)σ2η + σ2λ]2
with
q = 2σ2εε(η(1− r) + λ)
x = σ2η(1− r)
Then
Li =
σ2ε [x
2 + σ4λ + 2xσ
2
λ] + σ
4
ε(σ
2
η(1− r)2 + σ2λ + 2η(1− r)λi) + q[x+ σ2λ]
2[σ2ε + x+ σ
2
λ]
2
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